Living in London means that half of the year the weather is awful. As an academic, the conference circus provides some relief. This January I spent a week at the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Santiago, Chile. Flying over the Andes mountains is a thing to behold already. But Chile also boasts … Continue reading Notes from SAET 2024, Santiago, Chile
Why Do Banks Exist? An Incomplete Contracts Perspective
Bank lending has proven to be quite resilient. The onset of digital financial markets has not upended the fact that most small- and medium-sized companies seek financing from banks, not via the issuance of bonds. And if game-theoretic literature from the 80s and 90s is any guide, this will not change anytime soon. Decentralized bond … Continue reading Why Do Banks Exist? An Incomplete Contracts Perspective
Coase on ‘the role of stupidity in human affairs’
I have to admit that I derive particular pleasure when economists are outright grumpy in their academic writing. Not all wisdom is tame. The following is an excerpt from an article written by 87-year-old Ronald H. Coase, who, when asked why a market-based allocation mechanism for spectrum licenses he had advocated for—decades later raising treasury … Continue reading Coase on ‘the role of stupidity in human affairs’
Monopolistic Competition: The Quality-Variety Trade-off in the Market for Advertisement-Financed Media
Numerous papers have examined the transformation of legacy media following the spread of social media in 2008. I will return to this topic. This post deals with an earlier period: the 80s and the advent of private, advertisement-financed television. There exists a prevailing notion that the introduction of private, advertisement-financed television led to a decline … Continue reading Monopolistic Competition: The Quality-Variety Trade-off in the Market for Advertisement-Financed Media
Is Market Power Self-limiting? Secret Contracting in Upstream Markets
Many courses in economics begin with the first welfare theorem. This theorem states that a decentralized market, if left to its own devices, will reach an allocation that cannot be changed to further improve the economic welfare of all market participants. A proof of this result is as simple as it is intuitive: If there … Continue reading Is Market Power Self-limiting? Secret Contracting in Upstream Markets
About this blog
The hold-up problem derives from ideas in game theory. It tells the story of a worthwhile investment that did not come to pass because its beneficiary could not commit to not exploiting the investor once an investment was made. To theorists, it underlines the importance of commitment and contractual enforcement. It has been invoked in … Continue reading About this blog
